Kuwait Sofa Agreement

The complex defence relationship between Japan and South Korea, with the United States as K negotiators, illustrates this logic. Footnote 100 A Japanese military analyst said: « Japan and South Korea are currently cooperating indirectly through the United States. If the two nations cooperate directly, it would reduce the burden on the United States. Footnote 101 For example, a direct Japanese-Korean DCA would allow Japan`s signal intelligence to complement South Korea`s vast human intelligence and ultimately improve the ability of the three governments to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat. U.S. analysts and defense officials agree that all parties would benefit from the « triangle completion. » Footnote 102 But an agreement remains elusive, almost exclusively because of the persistent mistrust. As a result, the United States acted as an « honest broker » and adopted numerous confidence-building measures, including footnote 103, including secondary talks at multilateral events, the annual trilateral defence conference and small « Tabletop » exercises, as well as interim extensions on interoperability, logistics and procurement. Footnote 104 The success of these actions depends on the ability of the mediator to credibly inform each party of the reliability of the others. Together, these characteristics define DCAs as a form of cooperation in its own right. The annex also describes the differences between DCAs and defence and non-attack pacts, as well as the status of military agreements (SOFAs), strategic partnerships and confidence-building measures (CBM). It also contains an example of a full text of a DCA. Between DCAs, the problem is the main source of heterogeneity.

Some agreements, such as the DCA between France and India, cover all possible areas of defence cooperation. Others are narrower and only partially cover the key themes I have described. For example, countries can sign a DCA on mutual consultations and another on cooperation in the defence sector. However, governments recognize these narrower agreements as part of a broader defence framework; Indeed, they often use generic DCAs to combine various work-pieces. When Bangladesh and China signed a DCA in 2002, their respective prime ministers said it was necessary to « institutionalize existing defence agreements and streamline existing fragmentary labour agreements to improve cooperation in training, maintenance and certain production sectors. » Footnote 19 Whether the DCAs take the form of an agreement or a set of agreements, they move towards the single objective of an institutionalized defence framework. I study DCA heterogeneity in the appendix and show that the empirical results are robust, even if the analysis is limited to the most common DCAs. The U.S.-Brazil Defence Cooperation Agreement came into force on June 26, 2015. This agreement, the first formal defence agreement between Brazil and the United States in more than thirty years, is ambitious and promotes cooperation in the areas of defence, particularly in the areas of research and development, logistical support, technological security and the acquisition of defence products and services, as well as « information exchange » , « combined military training, » joint military exercises, « meetings between equivalent defence institutions » and « exchanges of trainers and training personnel. » Footnote 1 Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has signed similar bilateral defence cooperation agreements (DCAs) with dozens of partners.