How these procedural grounds are applied will be of considerable interest, given that there is no generally accepted process and unique procedures that are often related to mediation. B (for example, a mediator who, in many cases, has private discussions with each of the parties). To ensure that these reasons are not overly widespread, a cause-and-effect relationship has been added between the behaviour or non-disclosure and the comparison entry, which will provide a relatively high reference. Article 2, paragraph 3, contains a broad definition of mediation as an attempt by the parties to « achieve, with the assistance of a third party or a third party (the « Mediator »), an amicable settlement of their dispute, which does not have the power to impose a solution on the parties. » As long as the regime is covered by this definition, the Singapore Agreement applies regardless of whether or not the resolution process is called « mediation. » Similarly, mediation does not need to be managed by a mediation body or an accredited mediator. This provision is deliberately broad and aims to enhance the attractiveness of the Singapore Agreement by not overly prescriptive and by maintaining flexibility, which is one of the attractive features of mediation.4 The actual rate of non-compliance with negotiated transaction agreements is in fact already low3, as the parties are unlikely to refuse to conclude a settlement agreement that they themselves supervise time and negotiation efforts. However, if there is a perceived (and not real) inability to effectively implement a negotiated transaction agreement, the Singapore Agreement will be an important step in promoting cross-border mediation, which will provide the parties with a security framework for the application and legitimacy of the process. The promotion and education associated with the introduction of the Singapore Agreement will also provide much greater awareness of the process and, without a doubt, increased impetus for mediation associations and focus on processes. The UN Convention on International Comparative Agreements, a result of mediation – also known as the Singapore Mediation Convention – was opened for signature in Singapore on 7 August 2019. Forty-six countries, including the United States, China and Singapore, signed the agreement on the first day (1).
Many commentators, described as the equivalent of the New York Agreement on the Recognition and Application of Foreign Arbitration Awards (New York Convention), herald the Singapore Agreement as a crucial moment for the growth of mediation as a method of dispute resolution. In this briefing, Rob Palmer, Georgia Quick, Cathryn Neo and Ed Davies consider some of the key features of the Singapore agreement and its potential effects on commercial parties. The reasons given for denying exemption from a section 5 negotiated transaction agreement are exhaustive. Some of them largely resemble those of the New York Convention, including: 2 Successful mediation leads to a transaction agreement. At present, however, it may be difficult to ensure that the other party complies with the terms of the transaction agreement, which is only contractually binding and is therefore not directly applicable in court. This is an obstacle to the international growth of mediation, as acknowledged by surveys of lawyers and users at recent IMI Global Pound conferences. Until now, there has been no effective international mechanism for recognizing and implementing these comparative agreements for international trading parties.